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DISCLOSURE OF PRESENTENCE REPORTS IN
FEDERAL COURT: DUE PROCESS AND
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
An examination of the longstanding controversy surrounding the
need to disclose to the defendant information contained in the presen-
tence report' illustrates the difficulty in reconciling the societal inter-
ests which the sentencing process is intended to serve with the personal
rights and interests of the convicted individual. This reconciliation is
essential to the development of a procedure which is both efficient and
fair. It is, in short, the import of the constitutional directive that no
one should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.2
On April 22, 1974, proposed amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure were transmitted to Congress by the Supreme
Court.3 Included was a proposal to make disclosure of the presentence
report to the defendant mandatory in most cases. 4  This proposed
amendment represents a significant departure from the present rule
which makes disclosure in all cases subject to the discretion of the sen-
tencing judge.3
This note will analyze both the current rule governing disclosure
of presentence reports and the proposed amendment thereto in an ef-
fort to determine the degree to which these procedures effectively rec-
1. The disclosure question has prompted considerable debate among legal com-
mentators. See, e.g., Guzman, Defendant's Access to Presentence Reports in Federal
Criminal Courts, 52 IowA L. RaV. 161 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Guzman]; Higgins,
Confidentiality of Presentence Reports, 28 ALBANY L. REV. 12 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Higgins]; Higgins, In Response to Roche, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 225 (1965); Kuh, For
a Meaningful Right to Counsel on Sentencing, 57 A.B.AJ. 1096 (1971); Roche, The
Position For Confidentiality of the Presentence Investigation Report, 29 ALBANY L.
REv. 206 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Roche]; Sharp, The Confidential Nature of Pre-
sentence Reports, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 127 (1955).
2. "[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given
set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the gov-
ernment function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." Local 473, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
3. PRoPosED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuTES OF CRImINAL PROcEDURE
FOR THE UNrrED STATES DIsnucr CouRTs, 62 F.R.D. 271 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
PRoPosED RuLEs].
4. Id. at 320-21.
5. FED. R. Crum. P. 32(c)(2).
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oncile the societal and individual interests involved; it will, in other
words, consider the extent to which they satisfy the highest ideals em-
bodied by the due process concept. To this end, a brief historical anal-
ysis will be undertaken, followed by a consideration of due process
rights as they effect report disclsoure. The conceptual and practical
insufficiency of the current rule in assuring due process rights to con-
victed individuals will then be discussed, and, finally, the effectiveness




The use of presentence reports was precipitated, in the first half
of this century, by the development of a penal theory which held that
the best way to protect society from criminal behavior was to "fit the
treatment to the individual; not the punishment to the crime ... "I
Full acceptance of this individualized disposition theory within the
federal system,' coupled with the determination that the sentencing
power is most properly vested in the judiciary," formed the conceptual
justification for vesting in the judge a broad discretion9 as to the sen-
tence to be imposed.
Clearly, the proper exercise of this discretion requires a broad in-
formational basis upon which the appropriate disposition can be made.
The federal commitment to individualized disposition thus necessitated
that the judge have access to certain information which could not be
found in the trial record. 10 As a result, information about the defend-
ant's history and character, although inadmissible at trial, must be avail-
able to the judge.
The Presentence Report
A principal source of information used by the court at sentencing
6. Bergan, The Sentencing Power In Criminal Cases, 13 ALBANY L. REv. 1, 3
(1949).
7. Original adoption of the theory in federal courts was predicated upon the man-
date for suspended sentences and for probation in The Federal Probation Act, ch. 521,
§§ 1-4, 43 Stat. 1259-60 (1925), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, 3653-55 (1970). To
accomplish the purpose of the act, it was said, "an exceptional degree of flexibility in
administration is essential. It is necessary to individualize each case, to give that care-
ful, humane and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each offender
.Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
8. See generally Goodman, In Defense of Federal Judicial Sentencing, 46 CALIF.
L. Ray. 497 (1958).
9. Unless otherwise noted, all references made herein will be to federal court
practices.
10. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
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is the presentence report. The federal rules provide that a presen-
tence report shall be made prior to the imposition of sentence unless
the court direct otherwise.1 In fiscal year 1973 presentence reports
were submitted in approximately 83 percent of the criminal cases in
which sentences were imposed.' 2  According to the federal rules, the
presentence report should contain
any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information
about his characteristics, his financial condition and the circum-
stances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sen-
.tence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of
the defendant, and such other information as may be required by
the court.'3
Although used widely by the court, reports are not prepared exclu-
sively for it; probation office guidelines for preparation of the report
are aimed at creating a detailed composite of the offender's back-
ground which will serve at least five functions.' To this end, the
guidelines state that the ultimate purpose of the presentence report is
to focus light on the character and personality of the defendant,
to offer insight into his problems and need, to help understand the
world in which he lives, to learn about his relationship with peo-
ple and to discover the salient factors that underlie his specific of-
11. FED. R. Cunim. P. 32(c)(1). There are dicta which suggest that a court's order
not to prepare a presentence report could be reversed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 744 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944
(1972); United States v. Teague, 445 F.2d 114, 122 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Spadoni, 435 F.2d 448, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1970). There are no instances, however, where
such an order has actually been reversed. But cf. United States v. Manuella, 478 F.2d
440 (2d Cir. 1973). At least one commentator has asserted that in actual practice, no
report is prepared unless specifically requested by the court. Lehrich, The Use and Dis-
closure of Presentence Reports in the United States, 47 F.R.D. 225, 227 (1969). The
proposed amendment to rule 32(c) (1) would require that a judge state reasons for order-
ing that a presentence report not be prepared. PROPOSED RuLES, supra note 3, at 320.
12. In 1973 there were 34,983 criminal convictions in federal district courts. THE
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DECrOR OF THn AD MnSTATivE OFmCFE OF THE UNrrED
STATES CouRTs 212 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ADmINISTRATIVE REPORT 1973]. Also
in 1973 there were 29,736 presentence reports prepared. Id. at 267. Of the reports pre-
pared, 644 were never submitted to the court. Id. at 266.
13. FE. R. Cim. P. 32(c)(2).
14. "(1) To aid the court in determining the appropriate sentence, (2) to assist
Bureau of Prisons institutions in their classification and treatment programs and also in
their release planning, (3) to furnish the Board of Parole with information pertinent
to its consideration of parole, (4) to aid the probation officer in his rehabilitative efforts
during probation and parole supervision, and (5) to serve as a source of pertinent in-
formation for systematic research." DnsION OF PROBATION, ADmNISmTIVE OFFICE
OF THE U.S. Coumts, PuB. No. 103, T1m P.SrENTENCE INvEGATiON REPORT 1 (1965).
A detailed outline for use in compilation of presentence reports was adopted in 1965
by The Judicial Conference Committee on The Administration of the Probation System.
Id. See generally Chandler, Latter Day Procedures in the Sentencing and Treatment
of Offenders in the Federal Courts, 37 VA. L. Rav. 825 (1951).
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fense and his conduct in general. It is not the purpose of the re-
port to demonstrate the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 15
Presentence reports are prepared and submitted to the court by
the federal probation service.' 6 There is no accurate method of mea-
suring the amount of time spent in the preparation of each report. Fig-
ures for 1973 indicate that if all reports prepared by the probation serv-
ice were allocated equally among the service's personnel, each officer
would annually be responsible for the preparation of thirty-seven re-
ports. 1 It is estimated by a probation office official that an officer
should have two to four weeks to prepare his report.' 8 These statistics
when viewed together seem to indicate that the workload of the proba-
tion service is greater than is desirable; this inference is supported by
the fact that despite congressional authorization to increase the num-
ber of probation officers,'0 a backlog of unfinished presentence investi-
gations has developed in the most congested districts.2" Notwithstand-
ing the competence of the probation office, an overburdened investigat-
ing structure must ultimately have an adverse effect on both the accu-
racy and the quality of the report which is produced. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is not unlikely that these reports, which can have a great
influence in an individual's future, may contain inaccurate facts or con-
clusions.
21
Disclosure Under the Federal Rules
Prior to their amendment in 1966, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were silent on the issue of disclosure. 2  The final draft of
the superseded rules, as submitted to the Supreme Court by the Rules
Advisory Committee, provided that the presentence report should be
made available to the attorneys for the parties and to other persons or
agencies having a legitimate interest therein "subject to such conditions
15. DIVISION OF PROBATION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PUB.
No. 103, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 1 (1965).
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1).
17. ADmrNIsmnTTIVE REPORT 1973, supra note 12, at 269. "A probation officer
performing only investigative work could be expected to complete 128 presentence inves-
tigations per year plus his proportion of other investigative reports." Id. at 265.
18. Evjen, Some Guidelines in Preparing Presentence Reports, 37 F.R.D. 177, 178
(1964).
19. Congress authorized 168 additional probation officers and 84 clerical positions
in fiscal year 1973. ADMrNISTRATIVE REPORT 1973, supra note 12, at 265.
20. See United States v. Manuella, 478 F.2d 440, 443 (2d Cir. 1973) (two month
delay in preparation of reports in the Eastern District of New York).
21. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 27. The avoidance of inaccuracies in the presen-
tence report is central to the argument in favor of disclosure. See text accompanying
notes 93-96 infra.
22. FED. R. CGRM. P. 32(c).
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as the court may impose."2  For reasons that are not entirely clear,
this disclosure provision was deleted by the Court before the rule was
sent to Congress.24  Without statutory guidelines, widely divergent dis-
closure practices developed in the district courts.25  In a 1963 survey
of district judges, responses indicated that 56.8 percent of the judges
never divulged any information contained in the report to defense
counsel.
20
A significant segment of the legal community was dissatisfied with
the disclosure rule and practices which had developed under it. A sur-
vey of defense attorneys in the District of Columbia, where the prevail-
ing practice was to deny disclosure, revealed that all but one of the
lawyers questioned felt hampered by this policy, particularly because
they were unable to correct errors in the report.
2 7
Proponents of compulsory disclosure found support in several state
statutes which disapproved of the use of confidential presentence re-
ports.28  In 1962 the American Law Institute joined the movement by
including provisions for disclosure in its Model Penal Code. 9 Thus
bolstered, the Rules Advisory Committee in that same year completed
a preliminary draft of an amendment to rule 32(c). The amendment
would have added a provision requiring the court to furnish the defend-
ant, on request, a summary of the report and to allow the defendant
an opportunity to comment thereon.30
The second preliminary draft, completed in 1964, completely re-
vised the earlier proposal. In a lengthy amendment, the committee
23. ADVISORY COMm. oN RuLEs OF CRuMINAL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED FEDERAL
RuLES OF CRimAL PRoCEDURE 33-34 (June 1944).
24. One commentator has speculated that the Court's action was prompted by the
vigorous objection registered by Judge Carroll C. Hincks in his article advocating discre-
tionary disclosure. Higgins, supra note 1, at 13, referring to Hincks, In Opposition to
Rule 34(c)(2), Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 FED. PROB. 3 (Oct-
Dec. 1944).
25. The rule was construed to mean that the presentence report need not be dis-
closed to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960). Neither was it seen as a bar to disclosure. See,
e.g., Shields v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Minn. 1965). The variety of
disclosure practices under the old rule are summarized in Higgins, supra note 1, at 15-
16.
26. Higgins, supra note 1, at 15.
27. Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 124 (1963).
28. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 23 (1959); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1203, 1203.05
(West Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.115(4) (1964); OKRA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§§ 973-75 (1951); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-13 (1953).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
30. PRELMINARY DRAFt OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDEAL RuLEs OF
CRniENAL PRocEDURE FOR THE UNrED STATEs Disnucr CouRTS, 31 F.R.D. 665, 686
(1962).
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proposed that defendant's counsel be allowed to read the presentence
report with the confidential sources deleted or that a defendant not rep-
resented by counsel be somehow apprised of the essential facts con-
tained in the report. In no event would this proposal have required
the disclosure of confidential sources.3 ' The revised draft met with
substantial opposition from the judiciary. A survey of district judges
revealed that of the 270 judges who responded, only 18 favored the
proposed rule.32 The Judicial Conference Committee on the Adminis-
tration of the Probation System, which had conducted the survey,
unanimously recommended that the proposed rule not be adopted. 3
It was not. The Rules Advisory Committee withdrew the pro-
posed disclosure rule and submitted to the Supreme Court an amend-
ment which did nothing more than codify the nebulous case law. The
proposed amendment was approved, and it became effective on July
1, 1966.11 It provides:
The court before imposing sentence may disclose to the defendant
or his counsel all or part of -the material contained in the report
of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the
defendant or his counsel to comment thereon. Any material dis-
closed to the defendant or his counsel shall also be disclosed to the
attorney for the government.3"
There is no evidence that this amendment had any impact on the fre-
quency with which reports have been disclosed, but it seems to have
prompted an increased number of appeals challenging the propriety of
nondisclosure. For the most part, these appeals have been dismissed
with summary findings that refusal to disclose was not, under the cir-
cumstances, an abuse of discretion. 6
The substantial support for some form of mandatory disclosure did
not subside. 17 The Rules Advisory Committee, in January 1970, once
31. SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED AmENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRIcT COURTS, 34 F.R.D.
411, 437-38 (1964).
32. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, MARCH 18-19, 1965 33 (1966).
33. Hoffman, What Next in Federal Criminal Rules?, 21 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1, 19 n.40 (1964).
34. FED. R. CiM. P. 32(c)(2).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Virga, 426 F.2d 1320, 1323 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 930 (1971); United States v. Lloyd, 425 F.2d 711, 712 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Devore, 423 F.2d 1069, 1074 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
950 (1971); United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1214 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1013 (1970); Good v. United States, 410 F.2d 1217, 1221 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970); United States v. Baker, 388 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir.
1968).
37. Subsequent to the 1966 amendment two additional groups recommended some
form of mandatory disclosure. AmEICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
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again provided for compulsory disclosure in its preliminary draft of
amendments to the federal criminal rules.38 The proposed amendment
survived a second preliminary draft without change39 and was only
slightly revised in the final draft which was submitted to and approved
by the Supreme Court.40  The proposed rule 32(c)(3) includes the
following provisions:
(A) Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request per-
mit the defendant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to
read the report of the presentence investigation exclusive of
any recommendation as to sentence, unless in the opinion of
the court the report contains diagnostic opinion which might
seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of
information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or
any other information which, if disclosed, might result in
harm, physical or otherwise, to the defendant or other per-
sons; and the court shall afford the defendant or his counsel
an opportunity -to comment thereon.
(B) If the court is of the view that -there is information in the
presentence report which should not be disclosed under sub-
division (c)(3)(A) of this rule, the court in lieu of making
the report or part thereof available shall state orally or in
writing a summary of the factual information contained
therein to be relied on in determining sentence, and shall
give the defendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment
thereon. The statement may be made to the parties in
camera.
4 1
The proposed amendments, including the disclosure amendment,
were submitted to Congress on April 22, 1974.42 There they were re-
ferred to the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary
Committee which solicited opinions on the proposed amendments from
various segments of the legal community. 43 The response indicated
significant disagreement as to the desirability of many of the proposed
amendments.44 In order to allow detailed consideration of the contro-
SENTENciNG ALTERNATIvEs AND PROCmDUPES, § 4.4, at 213 (approved draft, 1968)
[hereinfater cited as ABA STANDARDS]; PRESIDENT'S COMMISsIoN ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY
145 (1967).
38. PRELImINARY DAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDmENTs TO THE FEDERAL. RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNrr STATES Dis~mcr COuRTS, 48 F.R.D. 547, 614-
15 (1970).
39. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTs TO THE FEDRAL RuLES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNrri STATEs DisTUcr COURTS AND TIE FmERAL
RuLEs OF APPELLATE PR OcEDuRg, 52 F.R.D. 409, 452-53 (1971).
40. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3.
41. Id. at 320.
42. Id. at 271.
43. H.R. REP. No. 1144, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
44. HousE SuBCOmm. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDI-
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versial proposals,45 Congress postponed the effective date of the
amendments from August 1, 1974 to August 1, 1975.46 At this writing
there has been no further action on the proposed rule changes.
Judicial opinion concerning the proposed amendments seems to
have focused on changes in rules others than proposed rule 32(c)(3).
Because this rule has not been subject to the same criticism by the ju-
diciary as have its predecessors, 47 its adoption at this point seems prob-
able.
Disclosure and Procedural Due Process
Williams v. New York
One recurrent obstacle to the disclosure of presentence reports is
the widespread but erroneous4 8 notion that the Supreme Court has re-
jected a due process challenge to the confidentiality of such reports.
This notion stems primarily from a misconstruction of the Court's hold-
ing in Williams v. New York, 49 upon which lower courts have fre-
quently relied in holding that due process does not require disclosure.5"
Even the Rules Advisory Committee, while advocating liberalized dis-
closure practices, cited Williams as the basis for its concession that non-
disclosure is not a denial of due process. 5' Nevertheless, the Williams
decision does not so hold.
Williams was convicted of first degree murder under the New
York felony murder rule,52 and he appealed from the imposition of a
death sentence. Citing several factors disclosed in the presentence re-
port,53 the trial judge had rejected the jury's recommended sentence
cARY, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., COMMENTARY: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS FEDERAL RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Comm. Print 1974).
45. Federal Rules which are approved by the Supreme Court and transmitted to
Congress become effective 90 days thereafter unless Congress acts to prevent their en-
actment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 37-1-72 (1970).
46. Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397.
47. House SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., COMMENTARY: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS FEDERAL RULEs
OF CaMINAL PocEDut (Comm. Print 1974).
48. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 37, § 4.4, Commentary (b), at 223-24.
49. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Virga, 426 F.2d 1320, 1323 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 930 (1971); Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968);
Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1967). But see United States v.
Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 218-19, n.4 (1st Cir. 1972).
51. FED. R. Cium. P. 32, Advisory Comm. Notes, 18 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1970).
52. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1044 (McKinney 1967).
53. The judge stated at sentencing that the presentence report revealed that the
defendant had participated in 30 burglaries in the same neighborhood in addition to the
one which resulted in the homicide that the defendant possessed a "morbid sexuality"
and was a "menace to society." 337 U.S. at 244.
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of life imprisonment and sentenced Williams to death. Thus, the de-
fendant was clearly apprised of the informational basis for his sentence.
He did not dispute the veracity of that information either at sentencing
or on appeal. Writing for the Court, Justice Black considered the sen-
tencing court's reliance on information other than that presented at trial
and held that due process did not dictate that all such information be
verified in a trial-type proceeding. 54 The disclosure of the report itself,
however, was not at issue. In fact, it was not even mentioned in the
opinion of the Court.55
Perhaps when presented with the question, the current Court will
decide it as the Court is said to have done in Williams." At present,
however, the issue of whether nondisclosure is consistent with due
process cannot be disposed of by mere citation to a Supreme Court de-
cision.
The Criteria
For the most part, discussions of due process presuppose an intui-
tive grasp of the nature of the concept 7 There is some justification
for this reliance on innate human understanding since the concept de-
rives largely from our sense of fundamental fairness. 8 But due proc-
ess is also closely related to this nation's common law heritage, and a
healthy distrust of vague philosophical notions often prompts the Court
to rely on longstanding precedent for the determination of what proc-
ess is due in a given case. 59
Perhaps the Court's most articulate discussion of due process cri-
54. Id. at 250-51.
55. Guzman, supra note 1, at 173.
56. Also cited as holding that nondisclosure does not violate due process are Wil-
liams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), and Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
In the former, the Court held that due process was not violated by the admission of
unsworn statements by the state attorney as to the nature of the crime and the defend-
ants prior record. In Specht, the Court merely reaffirmed its holding in Williams v.
New York while refusing to apply the Williams rule to civil commitment proceedings.
Neither decision mentions or considers the disclosure of presentence reports.
57. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1948).
58. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Howard v. United
States, 372 F.2d 294, 301 (9th Cir. 1967).
59. "Therefore, as a generalization, it can be said that due process embodies the
differing rules of fair play, which through the years, have become associated with differ-
ing types of proceedings." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). This gener-
alization has its exceptions. "Of course, this wise reminder, that what free people have
found consistent with their enjoyment of freedom for centuries is hardly to be deemed
to violate due process, does not freeze due process within the confines of historical facts
or discredited attitudes." Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371 (1959). See also
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United
States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 863 (2d Cir. 1965).
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teria was prompted by the disagreement among members of the Court
over the extent to which the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment extended to the states the obligations which the Bill of
Rights imposed upon the federal government. 60 Justice Frankfurter,
who consistently argued for a conservative approach to Fourteenth
Amendment due process, 6 considered history62 and predominant cur-
rent practices63 to be reasonably reliable indicators of what process was
due. It was, however, his ultimate contention that
[a]pplication of the broad restraints of due process compels in-
quiry into the nature of the demands being made upon individual
freedom in a particular context and the justification of social need
on which the demand rests.
64
This analytical balancing process has been the basis of several due
process decisions65 and seems to stem from the conviction that
individual liberty should not be restricted unless the public need for
a specific restriction is demonstrably greater than the individual inter-
est in being free from that restriction.66 It therefore seems germane
to consider the compatibility of due process with nondisclosure of pre-
sentence reports by weighing the individual interest in having access




A defendant's interest in the outcome of a sentencing proceeding
is, for most defendants, even greater than his interest in the outcome
of the guilt determining process since the latter is, in many cases, a
foregone conclusion.68 The typical criminal statute, particularly in the
federal code, authorizes a broad range of potential dispositions for a
given offense.69 This statutory scheme vests in the sentencing judge
60. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTiTIONAL LAw 194-97 (1972).
61. See Pollak, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Judgment and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 67 YALE L.J. 304, 315-16 (1957). The term due process of law as used in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has the same meaning. Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884).
62. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367-70 (1959).
63. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1949).
64. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959); accord, Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420, 487 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., Local 473, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961);
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
66. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965).
67. See United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1190 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
68. See ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT 1973, supra note 12, at 262.
69. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970) (rape punishable by death or imprisonment
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what has been called "the greatest degree of uncontrolled power over
the liberty of human beings that one can find in the legal system.
'70
This power, it should be remembered, is not limited to determin-
ing the length of time for which an offender should be incarcerated.
The judge at sentencing may, in any case where the offense is not pun-
ishable by death or life imprisonment, elect to suspend the sentence
imposed and release the offender on probation.7 1  Moreover, in any
case where the offender is not yet twenty-six years old,72 the judge
may, in his discretion, enable the offender to be ultimately relieved of
all taint of his criminal conviction and of the collateral consequences
which stem from his offense by sentencing the defendant under the
Youth Corrections Act.73
A convicted defendant, facing a sentencing judge who possesses
such vast discretion, 4 has an interest in that judge's determination of
his future far exceeding the individual interests of persons in non-
criminal proceedings which have been deemed sufficient to require sig-
nificant procedural safeguards. 5 A policy which denies the offender
access to the contents of the presentence report undermines the effec-
tiveness of procedural protections which are accorded to an offender
at sentencing and thus infringes upon this individual's interest in receiv-
ing the full benefit of those protections. An analysis of the nature and
purpose of the existing safeguards supports this conclusion.
The first and most important of these protections is the right to
for any term of years or for life); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113 (Supp. 1975) (bank robbery pun-
ishable by $5,000 fine or imprisonment for not more than 20 years or both); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1111 (1970) (second degree murder punishable by imprisonment for any term of years
or for life).
70. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Process, 75
HAZv. L. R v. 904, 916 (1962).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970), as amended (Supp. 11, 1973).
72. Id. § 4209 (1970).
73. Id. § 5021.
74. "All would presumably join in denouncing a statute that said 'the judge may
impose any sentence he pleases.' Given the mortality of men, the power to set a man
free or confine him up to 30 years is not sharply distinguishable." Frankel, Lawlessness
in Sentencing, 41 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1, 4 (1972).
75. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (the individual's interest in
receipt of welfare benefits requires the procedural protections of confrontation and cross-
examination before such benefits can be withheld); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969) (the individual's interest in receipt of wages requires the procedural
protection of notice and the opportunity to be heard before such wages can be attached).
In recent decisions the Court has refused to apply the reasoning of Goldberg and Snia-
dach in seemingly appropriate cases. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974)
(procedural protection of notice and hearing not required prior to judicial authorization
of repossession of property purchased on an installment sales contract); Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (procedural protections of hearing and confrontation not re-
quired prior to dismissal of civil service employee).
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counsel.7 In Townsend v. Burke,7 the Supreme Court remanded for
resentencing a Pennsylvania case in which an uncounseled defendant
had been sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his crim-
inal record which were materially untrue. In holding that such sen-
tence was inconsistent with due process,78 the Court observed that
"[c]ounsel, had any been present, would have been under a duty to
prevent the court from proceeding on such false assumptions and per-
haps under a duty to seek a remedy elsewhere if they persisted. 79
Such a view of counsel's role at sentencing is consistent with Justice
Marshall's subsequent description of that role:
[T]he necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, intro-
ducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding
and assisting the defendant to present his case as to sentence is ap-
parent.8
0
It is well settled that the right to the assistance of counsel as guar-
anteed by the Sixth Amendment is a right to the effective assistance
of counsel. 81 In United States v. Meyers,8 2 the Third Circuit held that
a defendant who had been sentenced on the basis of the erroneous sup-
position that he was a three time offender had thereby been denied
the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney's attempt to cor-
rect the record was inadequate.83 If an attorney's unsuccessful attempt
to correct erroneous suppositions which are known to him is a denial
of effective counsel, it follows logically that a defense counsel who is
not able even to discover such errors because the presentence report
is confidential is incapable of providing the representation to which his
client is entitled.84
There is some indication that the Supreme Court would accept this
reasoning. In Kent v. United States,85 the Court held, in a substan-
tially analogous situation, 6 that a juvenile's counsel must be given ac-
76. The right to counsel applies at sentencing. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
134 (1967).
77. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
78. Id. at 741.
79. Id. at 740.
80. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967) (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
82. 374 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967).
83. Id. at 708.
84. See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1230 (2d Cir. 1973); Verdugo
v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 613 (9th Cir. 1968) (separate opinion), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 925 (1970); ABA ST A NARs, supra note 37, at 223; THE PRESIDEN's TAsK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 20 (1967).
85. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
86. It is not suggested that a jurisdictional hearing in juvenile court is substantially
similar to a sentencing proceeding. However, in both, the right of counsel attaches. In
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cess to the social records of his client which would be considered by
the juvenile court in deciding whether to waive exclusive jurisdiction.
The language of Kent strongly suggests that such access was necessary
to assure the effective assistance of counsel.1
7
The interference which confidential presentence reports pose to
effective legal representation is significant. Following the Meyers
analysis, it is arguable that the interference is sufficiently substantial to
amount to a denial of counsel. Nonetheless, it is not necessary to this
discussion to predict whether a court would accept this argument. At
least it is clear that the serious Sixth Amendment questions raised by
nondisclosure demonstrate a strong individual interest in having access
to the presentence report.
In the same way that the right to counsel is adversely affected by
nondisclosure, the right of the defendant to speak on his own behalf
at sentencing is impeded by such a policy. Although this right is not
constitutionally guaranteed, s8 it is statutorily assured: a federal rule of
procedure explicitly affords the defendant the right to make a state-
ment on his own behalf and to present information in mitigation of pun-
ishment.8 9 These guarantees were considered fundamental in the
common law courts, 0 and although modem safeguards, such as the
right to counsel, have made them less essential than they were in the
seventeenth century, a good deal of their efficacy survives. Moreover,
it is doubtful that any modem procedure could wholly eliminate the
value of these protections, for, as the Supreme Court noted in Green
v. United States,91
[n]one of these modern innovations lessens the need for the de-
fendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court
his plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may not be
able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting
eloquence, speak for himself.
92
Notwithstanding the eloquence of a defendant, his ability to offer
a plea in mitigation will, it seems clear, be inhibited if he must attempt
to make that plea without knowledge of the information which the pre-
sentence report has placed before the judge. Only if the defendant
both, one of counsel's primary responsibilities is to marshal the facts. When confiden-
tial social records are considered by the juvenile court, the effect upon the right to coun-
sel is the same as the effect of confidential presentence reports in the sentencing context.
It is this effect which the Court seems to be addressing in Kent. See ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 37, at 223.
87. 383 U.S. at 562-63.
88. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,428 (1962).
89. Fre. RuLE. CRIM. P. 32(a).
90. Cf. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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is able to soften the impact of information harmful to his cause and to
emphasize that which is favorable to him is his plea in mitigation likely
to have any effect on the sentence imposed. Without access to the pre-
sentence report, the defendant might have no notice that there is a
need to answer incriminating information contained therein, and the
effectiveness of his personal statement to the court might, as a result,
be greatly reduced.
Townsend v. Burke,93 discussed above in the context of the debil-
itating effect which nondisclosure has upon a defendant's right to coun-
sel,94 has been interpreted by several circuit courts as giving rise to a
significant due process right quite distinct from the right to counsel.
There is a developing line of cases which, on the strength of Townsend,
hold that
[m]isinformation or misunderstanding that is materially untrue re-
garding a prior criminal record, or materially false assumptions as
to any facts relevant at sentencing renders the entire sentencing
procedure invalid as a violation of due process. 95
As these cases implicitly indicate, the discussion in Townsend of coun-
sel's duty at sentencing adds nothing to the principle ultimately an-
nounced in that case that a sentence based on erroneous information
is inconsistent with due process. Inversely stated, a defendant has a
due process right to be sentenced on the basis of information which
is materially true. If the defendant is not apprised of the informa-
tional basis for the sentence imposed, he is effectively prevented from
protecting this right.96
93. 334 U.S. 736 (1948). See text accompanying notes 77-87 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
95. United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970); accord, Collins
v. Buchkroe, 493 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 219-
20 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1968).
See generally Note, In Sentencing the District Court May Not Rely Upon the Informa-
tion Contained in the Presentence Report Unless it is Amplified by Information Which
is Persuasive of the Validity of the Charge Made, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 560 (1972); Note,
Federal Appellate Court May Remand Criminal Sentence Based on Unverified Informa-
tion, 25 VAND. L. Rlv. 252 (1972).
96. In United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1972), and Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967), the Supreme Court held that a sentence which is based
in part on a prior conviction obtained in contravention of Gideon v. Wainwright, 373
U.S. 335 (1963), is a violation of due process. Moreover, in United States ex rel.
Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1969), it was held that consideration of an
unconstitutionally obtained confession in determining sentence is a violation of due proc-
ess. Arguably, access to the presentence report is necessary so that defendant can as-
certain whether the report refers to such an invalid prior conviction or confession. But
cf. United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983
(1971).
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The above discussed procedural safeguards-the right to counsel,
the right to offer a plea in mitigation, and the right to be sentenced
on the basis of information which is materially true-are of inestimable
importance to a defendant whose future is to be determined at sentenc-
ing. These, together with fairness and compassion of the sentencing
judge and the right to limited appellate review of the sentence imposed
are the only shields which the individual has against the virtually unlim-
ited power of the government. Within this context, the emasculation
of these protections by a policy of nondisclosure of presentence reports
is a clear infringement upon a substantial individual interest.
Public Interests
It is beyond the scope of this note to inquire into the public inter-
ests which give rise to the sentencing process, since to do so would re-
quire consideration of the social theory which is the basis of the entire
criminal justice system. Thus, this consideration of the public interests
which prompts a policy of nondisclosure begins with the supposi-
tion that criminal disposition is necessary to the efficient administration
of justice.
Advocates of nondisclosure generally allude to three potential
consequences of disclosure which, they suggest, demonstrate the com-
pelling public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of presentence
reports. Of these, the one most frequently cited by the courts when
considering this issue is the suggestion that compelled disclosure would
cause vital sources of information to dry up.9 7 This contention is sup-
ported by two arguments. First, it is urged that a probation officer,
in preparing a report, relies upon information obtained from persons
who are known to the defendant, and that a spouse, employer, neigh-
bor, or relative might be unwilling to supply sensitive information ab-
sent an assurance that any given information would remain confiden-
tial." Additionally, it is feared that information from other agencies,
such as family services, which themselves maintain a policy of confi-
dentiality would no longer be made available to the probation officer. 9
A second consequence of disclosure to which the courts frequently
allude is the resulting necessity for burdensome proceedings to chal-
97. See, e.g., United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1185 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968); People v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503, 504
(D.D.C.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960); State v. Moore, 49 Del. 29, 34, 108 A.2d
675, 678 (Super. Ct. 1954).
98. Proponents of this argument contend that to withhold the names of informants
while disclosing other contents of the report would not alleviate this problem because
often the information itself reveals the source. See Parsons, The Presentence Report
Must Be Preserved as a Confidential Document, 28 FED. PNOB. 3, 4 (March 1964).
99. See Roche, supra note 1, at 221-22.
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lenge information contained in the report. 100 It is argued that endless
delays would result from spurious challenges to each factual allegation
contained in the report, since a defendant facing a potentially harsh
sentence would have ample incentive to resort to any available device
to prolong that procedure.
Finally, it is contended, although more frequently by probation of-
ficers than by the courts, that to disclose the contents of the report to
the defendant might have an adverse effect on his rehabilitation. 101 It
is argued that certain information, such as psychiatric profiles, might
reinforce the paranoid personality traits which, it is said, are common
among criminal offenders. 02 Moreover, disclosure of an adverse re-
port might cause the defendant to harbor resentment against the proba-
tion officer, individually or as a class, thus inhibiting the development
of a beneficial working relationship between the officer and the of-
fender.'
These three suggested consequences of a disclosure policy form
the principle arguments for maintaining the confidentiality of presen-
tence reports. It is important to note that the public interest which
is served by maintaining confidentiality is the avoidance of a potential
danger in some cases and not the avoidance of consequences demon-
strably certain to result in all or substantially all cases.
The Balance
There are several material inadequacies in the argument against
a disclosure policy which tend to negate the contention that the public
interest requires confidentiality. First, it becomes increasingly difficult
to sustain the strongest argument for confidentiality, the threatened loss
of sources, as jurisdiction after jurisdiction adopts a compulsory disclo-
sure practice without any apparent impact on the available sources of
information.0 4 Moreover, those who argue that sources would be lost
base their contention almost entirely on speculation, 0 5 for there ap-
pears to be no published effort to set forth the actual experience in
100. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 49 Del. 29, 35, 108 A.2d 675, 679 (Super. Ct. 1954);
Morgan v. State, 142 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. App. 1962); People v. Peace, 18 N.Y.2d
230, 237, 219 N.E.2d 419, 423 (1966).
101. See, e.g., Roche, supra note 1, at 217.
102. Guzman, supra note 1, at 169 n.33.
103. Id. at 169.
104. See note 28 & accompanying text supra. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 37, at
219; Guzman, supra note 1, at 168-69; Higgins, supra note 1, at 31-32; Thomsen, Con-
fidentiality of the Presentence Report: A Middle Position, 28 FED. PROB. 8, 9 (Mar.
1964); Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports: A Constitutional Right to Rebut Ad-
verse Information by Cross-Examination, 3 RuTGERs (CAMDEN) L.J. 111, 124 n.77
(1971).
105. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 30.
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jurisdictions practicing disclosure. °6 In short, the fear that disclosure
would effect the quality of information contained in presentence re-
ports is not supported by competent evidence.
10 7
The suggestion that disclosure might inhibit the defendant's re-
habilitation is equally tenuous. Because such a result has never been
empirically validated, 0 8 the projection of such an effect can only be
viewed as an hypothesis. It seems equally compelling to suggest that
defendant's rehabilitation would be inhibited by a policy of nondisclo-
sure: a sentence imposed without indication of the reasons which
prompt it is likely to appear arbitrary and vindicative, and such an ap-
pearance would almost certainly breed resentment. Moreover, the ar-
gument that the report, when viewed by the defendant, might reinforce
his paranoid personality traits would seem to apply with equal force to
the entire dispositive process: if a defendant has a paranoid personal-
ity, the imposition of a lengthy prison sentence will, it seems clear, re-
inforce his parnoia regardless of whether he is apprised of the contents
of the presentence report.
The prediction that disclosure would result in a cumbersome pro-
cedure at sentencing is predicated on the unwarranted assumption that
a decision to disclose necessarily requires the utilization of precisely the
trial-type procedures which the Supreme Court has consistently disap-
proved of in the sentencing context. 0 9 Generally, the mandatory dis-
closure policies currently in force in some state courts, as well as the
proposed federal disclosure rule, allow the defendant and his counsel
an opportunity to comment on the contents of the presentence report,
but this opportunity for commentary is not an appreciable protraction
of the sentencing procedure. The defendant and his counsel are
already allowed to address the court prior to the imposition of sentence;
allowing them to comment on the report merely assures that they will
be able to use that opportunity to address all issues relevant to the de-
cision of the sentencing judge. If a defendant or his counsel actively
contest the accuracy of the report, the judge would presumably be re-
quired to evaluate the specific circumstances of the challenge and to
determine what procedures were necessary to insure that the defend-
ant would not be sentenced on the basis of untrue information."10 In
106. Id.
107. "Mhe quality and value of a presentence report will turn to an infinitely greater
extent on the skill of the probation service and the availability of adequate supporting
facilities than it will on whether its contents remain a secret." ABA ST'ANDmAaS, supra
note 37, at 219.
108. Guzman, supra note 1, at 169.
109. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
110. It has been suggested that one option available to the judge when the accuracy
of the report is challenged is to disavow, on the record, any reliance on the disputed
information. Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports: A Constitutional Right to Rebut
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a limited number of cases a judge might determine that an evidentiary
hearing is required. In that situation, it is suggested, the burden of
conducting such a hearing is not so onerous as the alternative of sen-
tencing a defendant unfairly. 1 '
These weaknesses in the argument for nondisclosure demonstrate
that the risk that harm will flow from a disclosure policy is not great.
When the governmental interest in avoiding that risk is weighed against
the demonstrated impact of nondisclosure on the individual's ability
to make full use of the rights accorded him at sentencing, it is not ade-
quate to justify a policy of confidentiality. In the absence of extraordi-
nary circumstances which substantially increase the danger incident to
disclosure, a refusal to allow a defendant access to the presentence re-
port prior to the imposition of sentence is, under the test described
above," 2 a denial of due process of law.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) (2): A
Discretionary Disclosure Rule
Standardless Discretion
Rule 32(c) (2) is most accurately described as one of permissive,
rather than discretionary, disclosure. If there is a distinction between
these terms, the courts have failed to make it, tending instead to use
the terms interchangeable. 1 3  Moreover, courts in each circuit have
at least acknowledged the possibility that a lower court's decision not
to disclose could be reversed for abuse of discretion." 4  Such review,
however, has proved to be uncommonly difficult because, as one apel-
Adverse Information By Cross-Examination, 3 RuTGERs (CAMDEN) L.J. 111, 122 n.65
(1971). Such a practice is followed in England where, when portions of the police re-
port are controverted by the defendant, the judge must either disregard the controverted
information or conduct an evidentiary hearing. Higgins, supra note 1, at 15.
111. There is an important governmental interest in avoiding the possibility that
a defendant will be sentenced unfairly because unfair treatment of any person violates
fundamental principles of our government and of our society. Moreover, the rehabili-
tative and deterrent objectives of the criminal justice system cannot be achieved when
the system operates unfairly, and it is society which must ultimately suffer the conse-
quences for the failure of the system. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65
(1970).
112. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
113. Compare Good v. United States, 410 F.2d 1217, 1221 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970), with Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir.
1968).
114. S'ee, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 485 F.2d 240, 242 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 219 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Dockery,
447 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); United States
v. Virga, 426 F.2d 1320, 1323 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110,
1120 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1214 (8th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Trice, 412 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1969); Good v. United States, 410 F.2d
1544 (Vol. 26
late judge pointed out, rule 32 is "strangely silent" on the question of
standards for the excercise of the discretion which it is said to confer.
115
In the eight years since rule 32(c) was amended to provide for
discretionary disclosure, the circuits have made only limited efforts to
establish standards for the excercise of that discretion. For the most
part, judicial efforts to articulate standards are to be found in dissent-
ing, concurring, or separate opinions, while the circuit courts have at-
tempted to guide the district courts by emphasizing the importance of
disclosure and by "encouraging a policy of carefully regulated but maxi-
mum disclosure."" 6
In a rare deviation from this pattern the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has recognized that the discretionary rule contemplates a case by
case consideration of the need for confidentiality. In United States v.
Queen,llT that court in a per curiam opinion, stated its position as fol-
lows:
[W]e believe that the discretion called for by Rule 32 is the exer-
cise of discretion in individual cases, not the discretion of -the trial
judge to adopt a uniform policy of nondisclosure."18
There are expressions by judges from the Fourth" 9 and Ninth
20
Circuits indicating concurrence with this position. The apparent fail-
ure of other circuits to acknowledge the need for a case by case consid-
1217, 1221 (5th Cir. 1969); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970); Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 933
(4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Weiner, 376 F.2d 42, 43 (3d Cir. 1967).
115. United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 219 (1st Cir. 1972). Most circuit
courts have approached the review of discretion with caution. Unaided by statutory or
judicial guidelines, intermediate courts have been understandably hesitant to probe too
deeply into the troublesome problems posed by the vast discretion of the sentencing
judge.
Problems related to judicial discretion at sentencing are considered in Frankel, Law-
lessness in Sentencing, 41 U. Cn. L. RPv. 1 (1972); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discre-
tion in the Sentencing and Police Process, 75 HAv. L. REv. 904 (1962); Palmer, A
Model of Criminal Dispositions: An Alternative to Official Discretion in Sentencing,
62 Gno. LI. 1 (1973). See also Comment, Discretion in Felony Sentencing-A Study
of Influencing Factors, 48 WAsH. L. Rnv. 857 (1973). "Regular, evenhanded adminis-
tration of the rule seems to have eluded us, and review for abuse of standardless discre-
tionary authority is inevitably difficult." United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1187
(D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
116. United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1187 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opin-
ion), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
117. 435 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
118. Id. at 67; accord, United States v. Bryant, 442 F.2d 775, 778 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971).
119. Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1968) (concurring opin-
ion).
120. Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 615 (9th Cir. 1968) (separate opin-
ion), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970).
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eration of disclosure may indicate nothing more than their basic as-
sumption that the rule requires such an approach. This suggestion is
supported by the fact that the courts in these other circuits generally
do consider the merits of the individual request for disclosure when re-
viewing a lower court's excercise of discretion.' 21
It has also been suggested that a circuit court should require a
judge who elects to withhold all or part of a report to state, on the rec-
ord, his reasons for doing so. 1 22  Such suggestions have largely been
ignored. Advocates of more liberal disclosure would certainly agree
that to require such a practice would greatly facilitate appeals from or-
ders denying disclosure, but stated reasons for nondisclosure would not
greatly aid a circuit court which had yet to resolve the crucial question
of how strict the standards for disclosure should be.
123
The most significant progress toward defining such standards is
seen in a movement to require disclosure of those portions of the pre-
sentence report which are actually relied upon by the sentencing judge,
unless withholding the report is necessary for the protection of the de-
fendant or other perons. This standard is a logically necessary exten-
sion of the interpretation that has been given to Townsend v. Burke.1
2
1
Although apparently only one circuit has explicitly adopted this disclo-
sure requirement, 125 two others have held that at least the defendant's
criminal record as shown in the report must be disclosed when it is re-
lied upon, 126 and three circuits have demonstrated some attraction to
the rule.
12 7
Each of the judicial refinements of rule 32 is a commendable at-
tempt to secure an even-handed excercise of discretion, and their uni-
form adoption would represent progress toward that end. In the last
analysis, however, the sentencing judge would still be without any
121. See, e.g., United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972); United States
v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1214 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1013 (1970).
122. See Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1968) (concurring
opinion).
123. See United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1188 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
124. 334 U.S. 736 (1948). See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra.
125. United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 220 (lst Cir. 1972); accord, United
States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 530 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Oshea, 479 F.2d 313
(Ist Cir. 1973) (applied Picard prospectively).
126. United States v. Janiec, 464 F.2d 126, 127 (3d Cir. 1972); Baker v. United
States, 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1967).
127. The Tenth Circuit has suggested that disclosure of considered reports may be
required. United States v. Green, 483 F.2d 469, 470 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1071 (1973). The Fifth Circuit, as early as 1955, hinted that failure to disclose the
basis of a sentence may constitute an abuse of discretion. Smith v. United States, 223
F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1955). The Sixth Circuit has expressed the same view. United
States v. Trice, 412 F.2d 209, 210 (6th Cir. 1969).
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workable guidelines for determining whether a specific situation de-
mands disclosure. It is unrealistic to expect that such guidelines could
be devised pursuant to a rule which has been conceived without refer-
ence to the dictates of due process. Judge Wright of the District of
Columbia Circuit has accurately stated the conceptual weakness of rule
32:
We have supposed that the issue of disclosure or nondisclosure was
a subtle one, varying substantially from case to case. Thus stand-
ardless ad hoe discretion did not seem an inappropriate means of
administering the rule's mandate that the court "may disclose" the
presentence report. Recently, however, both our assumption as to
the nature of the issue and our conclusion as to the propriety of
entirely unstructured discretion have been called into serious ques-
tion.' 28
Rule 32(c) (2): Due Process Inadequacies
If the analysis of due process requirements relating to disclosure
of presentence reports which is set forth above' 29 is accepted, the dis-
cretionary disclosure rule as written and applied is inadequate for sev-
eral reasons. Discretion is abused when the determination made under
authority of that discretion is arbitrary. 130 A determination is arbitrary
if it is not based upon adequate principles.' 3 ' According to the preced-
ing analysis of due process, a determination not to disclose is not based
upon adequate principles unless an overriding public interest out-
weighs the defendant's interest in having access to the report.'
32
The public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of presen-
tence reports lies in the avoidance of specific risks. Only when the
circumstances of a particular case substantially increase the magnitude
of one or more of those risks would nondisclosure be consistent with
due process. The existence of such a narrow exception to the general
requirement of full disclosure does not justify the broad discretion con-
ferred by the present rule. It would seem more appropriate for the
disclosure rule to enumerate the risks incident to disclosure which the
public has a legitimate interest in avoiding and to specify the magnitude
of that risk necessary to warrant nondisclosure. Since in the ordinary
case the individual's interest in disclosure exceeds the public interest
in confidentiality, the court should generally be compelled to disclose.
The current rule does not state as a general principle that the contents
128. United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
129. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
130. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 95 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir.
1938).
131. BL.ci's LAw DICIONARY 134 (4th ed. 1951).
132. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
May 1975]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of the report should be disclosed, and the courts have not read the rule
so broadly.
It is difficult to posit a situation in which the risks incident to dis-
closure would be so great and so pervasive as to necessitate withhold-
ing the entire report. For example, a determination that the defend-
ant is likely to abuse his spouse if a statement attributed to her in the
presentence report is disclosed to him might justify nondisclosure of that
statement, but it certainly does not justify withholding from the defend-
ant's attorney a statement in the report describing the defendant's prior
criminal record. 11 3 The present rule recognizes that partial disclosure
may, under some circumstances, be desirable, but such recognition
does not adequately assure that reports which should not be fully dis-
closed will be disclosed as fully as possible.
Similarly, when a portion of a presentence report must be with-
held, the defendant is still entitled to be apprised of the substance of
the withheld information to whatever extent, and by whatever method,
is consistent with the court's purpose for nondisclosure. The present
rule fails to provide for alternative methods of apprising the defendant
of the import of the withheld information. Specifically, it does not sug-
gest that the defendant's attorney might properly be given access to in-
formation which is wisely withheld from the defendant; nor does it en-
dorse the practice of orally summarizing the factual assumptions upon
which the sentence determination is based.
Finally, the present rule is deficient because it does not require
that a denial of access to the presentence report be accompanied by
a statement of reasons for that denial. If due process considerations
ordinarily compel disclosure, then a sentencing judge's determination
that circumstances in a particular case suspend that requirement should
be examined carefully. It is unreasonable to assume that an appellate
court is capable of determining whether a report has been improperly
withheld when the judge below is not required to state his reasons for
doing so.
Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3): A
Modified Discretionary Disclosure Rule
The proposed rule 32(c)(3) 13 4 only partially corrects the sub-
stantive inadequacies of the present rule. The proposed disclosure pro-
vision begins by announcing the general rule that the defendant or his
counsel shall, upon request, be given access to the presentence report,
exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence. 3 5 In so doing the
133. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 218.
134. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
135. PROPOsED RULES, supra note 3, at 320.
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proposal corrects one of the serious flaws in the current rule and, at
least implicitly, recognizes that for the most part the individual's inter-
est in having access to the report exceeds the public's interest in deny-
ing that access. To this general rule the proposal attaches a major ex-
ception permitting nondisclosure when,
in the opinion of the court the report contains diagnostic opinion
which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources
of information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or any
other information which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical
or otherwise, to the defendant or other persons. 136 ....
This provision is an attempt to allow the court to withhold the re-
port in those uncommon cases in which the risk of harm flowing from
disclosure is so great that it shifts the balance of interests away from
the individual. 13 7 Rather than making disclosure subject to the abso-
lute discretion of the sentencing judge, it specifies the circumstances
which might cause the balance to shift. To the extent that it does so
it is an improvement over the present rule. Nonetheless, the language
of the exception to the proposed rule is excessively broad and would
allow the court to deny disclosure whenever, in the opinion of the court,
any harm might result. Conceivably, harm might result from any dis-
closure. The rule does not describe either the degree of potential
harm or the degree of risk necessary to justify application of the excep-
tion. By its terms, the exception does not even require a finding that
the risk of harm exceeds the benefit to the defendant of disclosure. It
is therefore possible that disclosure could be denied under this sec-
tion even in situations in which the balance of interests clearly favors
the defendant. It would thus be possible for the exception to swallow
the rule and to result in a return to the nearly absolute discretion of
the present provision.
The amendment does not specify that when nondisclosure of a
part of the report is necessary, the unaffected portions of the report
should be disclosed. The amendment does, however, state unequivo-
cally that the court shall summarize the factual information contained
in a presentence report which is withheld. By so providing, the new
rule assures that a defendant will always be advised, at least to some
degree, of the informational basis for his sentence.
Nothing in the proposed disclosure provision remedies the present
rule's failure to require an on the record statement of reasons in sup-
port of the decision not to disclose. Proposed rule 32(c)(1) requires
that a judge who orders that a presentence report not be prepared state
his reasons for so ordering, 138 but inexplicably the same requirement
136. Id. at 320-21.
137. Id. at 322-25 (Advisory Comm. Note).
138. Id. at 320.
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is not imposed upon a judge who orders that the report not be dis-
closed. The failure to include such a provision in the amendment
might well dilute its overall effectiveness by impeding complete appel-
late review of disclosure practices under the new rule.
Conlusion
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee has sought since 1944 to
enact a disclosure rule which recognizes a criminal offender's substan-
tial interest in having access to the contents of the presentence report
and which protects that interest from unnecessary interference by the
government. The trial level judiciary's opposition to such a rule, how-
ever, has impeded the committee's progress toward that end.'39
To date, the circuit courts have had to seek resolution of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment questions raised by nondisclosure under the
mandate of a rule which was drafted without reference to constitutional
considerations. Thus hampered, the circuit courts have nonetheless
succeeded in gradually illuminating for the sentencing judge some of
the due process limitations on their discretion to withhold the report.
While the proposed amendment to rule 32(c) does not explicitly
acknowledge the constitutional questions which have troubled the
courts, it does implicitly address those questions. To the extent that
it does so, it will provide a statutory basis for judicial solution of the
disclosure problem. Even if the statute is grossly inefficient, its adop-
tion is likely to facilitate a clarified judicial statement of the defendant's
right to disclosure.
The positive aspects of the proposed rule must not, however,
blind the judiciary or the practitioner to its weaknesses. In the final
analysis, the rule is drawn with excessive deference for the arguments
of those who oppose disclosure, and the recognized need for compro-
mise has prompted the committee to accept the validity of every ob-
jection to disclosure which has been seriously advanced. Thus the sen-
tencing judge is authorized to consider in every case issues which, in
a great majority of circumstances, can and should be dealt with by stat-
ute. As a result, the sentencing judge is accorded a discretion which
is unnecessarily broad and which thus subjects implementation of the
rule to a variety of possible abuses. Admittedly, discretion is essential
to the implementation of accepted dispositive theory, but the potential
for abuse inherent in discretion demands that judicial discretion be only
so broad as justice requires.
William F. Gary*
139. See note 24 & text accompanying note 32 supra.
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